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ABSTRACT  
Evolution lies at the heart of the life sciences, and Charles Darwin is a towering historical 
figure within evolutionary science. One testimony to his lasting influence is that declaring 
Darwin to have been wrong all along remains a provocative way to command attention. 
The present paper discusses various strands of “Darwin was wrong” partisans and their 
divergent views and motives: some are looking to Darwin to justify or condemn the 
political ideologies that they support or reject; others are concerned with the corrupting 
influence that the bleak cosmic outlook of evolution is deemed to exert on the moral or 
religious rectitude of impressionable minds, or regard Darwinism as a direct assault on 
religion; philosophers question the very coherence of the entire enterprise; and certain 
biologists aspire to go down in history as even greater than Darwin. It is sobering to reflect 
that this diverse group is united only by their poor grasp of Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection.  
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1 Introduction  
Charles Darwin is one of the few scholars who have become emblematic of an epoch- 
making scientific innovation. It is true that such icons tend to attract more than their fair 
share of the credit, but they also become a lightning rod for the misgivings evoked by the 
paradigm shift they represent. Since Darwin’s theory of natural selection seems to have 
something to say on several aspects of life, at least in the eyes of the disgruntled, the sport 
of “Darwin bashing” continues to this day. Interesting historical, philosophical, religious, 
and scientific questions tend to get caught up in the melee, and here I propose to separate 
some of the wheat from the chaff, with a view mainly directed towards elucidating 
misconceptions and highlighting outstanding conceptual difficulties associated with 
evolutionary theory, rather than gratuitously exposing the errors of the anti-Darwinists.  
2 Social Darwinism and myth-making  
“If you take seriously that evolution has to do with the transition of life forms, and that life 
and death are just natural processes, then one gets to be liberal about abortion and 
euthanasia. All of those kinds of ideas seem to me to follow very naturally from a 
Darwinian perspective—a deprivileging of human beings, basically.”1 The added italics 
emphasise where the speaker, sociologist S. Fuller, commits the naturalistic fallacy of 
viewing natural phenomena (facts, processes, mechanisms) as somehow justifying or 
motivating normative positions, e.g. on abortion or euthanasia, or that human beings are 
less special because their biological make-up points to kinship with other forms of life. 
However, one simply cannot conclude that anything ought to be so in the affairs of humans 
because it is so in those of Nature, even if we are in the final analysis part of Nature.  
If the naturalistic fallacy were admissible, then perhaps science might claim credit for many 
a lofty ideal? Alas, it is often made a scapegoat: “Compassion and empathy leads you to a 
very glorious place, and science leads you to killing people” according to political activist 
B. Stein2. For instance, the mechanism of evolution can be characterised, somewhat 
uncouthly, as “selective breeding” and those who would apply this to civilised society 
might hide behind Darwin, even if selective breeding of animals and plants predates 
Darwin and, indeed, was a major source of inspiration for his theory. Are we to believe 
that eugenics would never have occurred to the noble minds of political thinkers had it not 
been for the corrupting influence of the theory of evolution?  
The catch phrase “survival of the fittest” was merely intended as a catchier rendition of 
“differential survival of individuals, and hence via the effects this has on their life-time 
reproductive outputs, and thus on the propensity of their types to persist, expand, or perish 
over trans-generational time.” This complex technical meaning is wholly discarded when 
“survival of the fittest” becomes, instead, the slogan of Social Darwinism, “a political 
ideology whose leading advocates take wealth to be a sign of individual and social virtue, 
whose advocates believe its concentration in fewer and fewer hands is not something for a 
democratic country to worry about, toy with the idea of getting rid of child-labour laws, 
regard unemployment and other social insurance as forms of coddling the unworthy poor, 
and hold health care to be a personal option for which the individual is responsible.”3 This 
would seem to be a kind of Darwinism that suits the economic right, as opposed to the kind 
that vexes their friends of the religious right who condemn evolutionary theory for its 
perceived support for abortion or euthanasia. 
Capitalism could equally well be justified by declaring the ability to accumulate wealth 
through professional success to be a divine sign that one belongs to the Chosen Few. Thus 
the doctrine of predeterminism becomes the culprit. Far less from shifting the blame to 
religion, this argument shows that metaphysical ideas, no matter their original intent and 
provenance, are all too easily gang-pressed into lending respectability to base purposes. 
 
Figure 1: Bones of contention. Some creationists continue to reject the fossil evidence 
outright. Shown here is a specimen of Rhamphorhynchus, a long-tailed pterosaur that lived 
during the late Jurassic.  
Still, could it not be said that evolution exudes a particularly nihilistic, barren bleakness 
that infects and corrupts the moral fibre of the general population, no matter how diligently 
we lecture on the naturalistic fallacy and similar flaws of reasoning? Would American 
politician R. Santorum not have a point when he says that, whether or not this is 
scientifically legitimate, “it is used to promote to a worldview that is anti-theist, that is 
atheist” 4 ?  
There are two distinctions to be made. The first is that between a natural phenomenon and 
a theory that purports to describe it, or bring order to our insights and understanding 
surrounding that phenomenon. One can take a stance on any number of theoretical 
approaches towards gravitation, but no sensible person would deny the existence of gravity 
qua phenomenon (or perhaps gravity-deniers are little heard of as they tend to have very 
bad falls). So it is with evolution: regardless of one’s feelings about any particular theory 
of evolution, the natural phenomenon as such is well-attested and should be beyond 
reproach (Fig. 1). This first distinction matters since any inherent bleakness (or grandeur, 
depending on one’s sensibilities) is already inherent in the facts of the matter.  
The second important distinction is that between pragmatic and dogmatic belief. The 
former is always provisional, held with a less-than-complete degree of confidence, and 
subject to revision when new empirical evidence becomes available, or else when new 
insights turn the received wisdom into a quaint and obsolete way of looking at things. There 
are of course gradations: we can be as sure as anything that gravity and evolution happen, 
for instance, and we have every reason to expect that future observations will further 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The fifth day of creation. Woodcut with 
watercolours by Michael Wulgemut (1493). Does 
evolution amount to a doctrine that is set to replace 
religious or humanistic teachings? And is the hand 
of the creator to be replaced by that of Darwin?  
consolidate our confidence in the existence of, say, the Higgs boson or gravitational waves. 
Dark matter is less well-understood and accordingly no astrophysicist is claiming a 
definitive understanding. Dogmatic belief, on the other hand, rules out any future revision 
in advance and demands conviction. The point here is not that dogmatic belief need be 
inherently inferior: it is possible for a person to practice either of them as circumstances 
may demand.  
Both these distinctions are blurred or even denied in creationist debates, and thus when we 
hear “belief in evolution” being disparaged, we must wonder whether the speaker intends 
to speak of pragmatic or dogmatic belief and whether evolution qua phenomenon or 
evolution qua theory is meant. Accusations of dogmatism, incidentally, so liberally hurled 
at evolutionary thinkers, seem to be rhetorical flourishes rather than thoughtful reflections 
on the distinction evoked here; dogmatism does not mean the mere unwillingness to accede 
to an untenable position. These two crucial distinctions need not even mean anything at all 
to the speaker, as seems evident when, for instance, creationist B. Feijen claims that 
evolution is the religion of the atheist5. 
Historian A. N. Wilson combines the ills of Social Darwinism and the theme of evolution-
as-religion by casting Darwin himself as the author of both6, offering “the emergent 
Victorian middle classes a consolation myth [an ersatz religion to the effect that] there was 
something inexorable, natural about their superiority to the working class.” In particular, 
“their land-grabs in Africa, their hunger for stock-market wealth in the face of widespread 
urban poverty, their rigid class system and their ever-lasting wars were not things to be 
ashamed of, but actually part of the processes of nature.” It is perhaps not surprising that 
Wilson does not even come close to correctly describing Darwin’s actual theory and fails 
to achieve basic accuracy with regard to biographical details7; but it certainly audacious to 
lampoon Darwin as the “Victorian mythmaker”: an ambitious (albeit flatulent) social 
climber who cared little for scientific accuracy and more for currying favour with his 
contemporaries.  
3 Progress, complexity, entropy, and statistics  
There is an almost irresistible temptation to organise life into a chain of being, proceeding 
relentlessly and ineluctably from “lower” to “higher” forms. It could well be a primal motif 
born from marvelling at our own place in the natural world. We readily discern unique 
abilities in ourselves, and yet we also discern our kinship with other forms of life, according 
to a decreasing scale of affinity. At the top of this scale we naturally see fit to place 
ourselves.  
This stratified, linear view of life, as a great chain or ladder, recurs throughout the world’s 
mythologies. A temporal or evolutionary connection in the modern sense, that of descent, 
is not implied: the idea is rather that of a hierarchy of structural perfection. Nevertheless, 
the chain motif has become a staple of popular accounts of evolution, exacerbated perhaps 
by a careless reading of the fossil record. There can be no real objection to theists who 
would regard evolution as a divinely guided process. However, if we retain the rhetoric, 
except for replacing every mention of the divine by a reference to natural selection, we are 
creating an unintended impression that we seek to usurp the supreme being and put Darwin 
on the throne (Fig. 2). If this conception of evolution were correct, the creationist 
objections would make rather more sense: we should then have cause to ask what endows 
the process with such a consistent impetus toward higher forms over the course of millions 
of years. And, blindly groping for advancement, how is it possible that evolution attains 
this goal, when natural processes tend not to create order spontaneously? Does this not 
violate fundamental thermodynamic principles? Actually, spontaneous creation of order is 
perfectly common-place even in the realm of dead matter: for instance, magnesium 
sulphate ions dissolving in water create more ordering in hydration shells than they 
abandon in the solid-form lattice. What matters is not just whether order is created or not, 
but the sign of the change in thermodynamic potential.  
3.1 The Second Law, entropy, and order  
If evolution is the attainment of higher order and complexity, it would seem to be reducing 
entropy, contrary to the law that it must always increase. But only the entropy of the 
universe as a whole must increase; locally, entropies can and do increase all the time. 
It is true that entropic arguments play a substantial role in biological complexity at the 
molecular level. Consider, for instance, the entropy decrease associated with the formation 
of a peptide bond: let us suppose that it is about 25 J mol−1K−1. However, amino acids in 
solution would give rise to a mixture of peptides, whereas the cell re- quires the amino acid 
residues in a protein to be in a particular order. This requirement adds a configurational 
entropy of circa −kB ln20 ≈ −25 J mol
−1 K−1 per peptide bond, where kB is Boltzmann’s 
constant. In view of the enthalpy change of peptide bond formation (∆H ≈ −14 kJ mol−1) 
this additional decrease in entropy is enough to tip the balance in favour of being 
thermodynamically unfavourable, as the reader may care to verify, taking e.g. T = 300 K 
and using the formula ∆G = ∆H − T ∆S where ∆G is the change in Gibbs energy and ∆S is 
the change in entropy. In bioenergetics we learn that the thermodynamically unfavourable 
formation of ordered biopolymers is balanced by coupling to reactions that are 
thermodynamically highly favourable; and the latter are replenished by the exchange of 
distinct species of chemical compounds with the environment; in the case of proteins this 
coupling is indirectly mediated by the process of peptide chain elongation effected by the 
ribosomes8. The question of rates is a related, but distinct one—few reactions in 
metabolism have a sufficiently large spontaneous rate that they do not require catalysis by 
enzymes.  
In principle, this elementary rejoinder –biota are thermodynamically open systems– should 
suffice to put paid to the objection from entropy. Undeterred, mathematician G. Sewell has 
proposed that the Second Law be reformulated to render the objection unassailable: 
“Natural (unintelligent) forces do not do macroscopically describable things that are 
extremely improbable from a microscopic point of view.”9 Ironically, “macroscopically 
describable” is nearly co-extensive with “entropically negligible” as any kind of 
supramolecular order that we perceive as “organised” or “structured” does not translate 
into measurable ∆S.  
The configurational entropy associated with the complex organisation of ostensibly higher-
grade organisms hardly affects the thermodynamic balance sheet of such organisms. 
Suppose that the synaptic wiring complexity of a human brain has a Kolmogorov 
complexity of 2K with K = 1013. This is (roughly) saying that K bits are needed to describe 
the brain’s wiring in some suitable description language. The configurational entropy 
equals kB K ln 2 ≈ 10
−10 J K−1 , which is negligible compared to the configurational entropy 
in the peptide sequences of the brain’s ∼ 0.1 kg of protein, which is equivalent to 25 J K−1. 
Even if our somewhat careless estimate for the Kolmogorov complexity of the brain’s 
wiring underestimates its true complexity by many orders of magnitude, this would make 
no difference whatsoever to the qualitative conclusion.  
A similar exercise may be carried out at the level of subcellular organisation. The reader 
may care to estimate the Kolmogorov complexity of subcellular organisation (i.e., 
compartmentalisation into organelles), by observing first that, if there are M 
macromolecules to be assigned to D spatial domains, then 2K = DM (M ∼ 1010, D ∼ 103) and 
subsequently comparing the configurational entropy of subcellular organisation to that of 
the primary sequences of the nucleic acids and the proteins.  
The overall conclusion must be that the exquisite histological and anatomical structuring, 
so characteristic of multicellular organisms, hardly amounts to anything much from the 
thermodynamical point of view, which perceives Amoeba proteus and Homo sapiens as 
equally “ordered” (in the thermodynamical sense) to a disconcertingly good degree of 
approximation. It is certainly true that the regulation and coordination of 
histological/anatomical organisation requires a host of signalling molecules. In fact, these 
signalling factors and pathways associated with regulation and development ac- count for 
a large portion of the genome and the proteome; this is the true correlate of our intuitive 
perception of certain organisms belonging to a higher grade than others. On the other hand, 
it is at the level of primary structure of these molecules that a substantial additional 
configurational-entropic cost is incurred. Questions of order and disorder are dominated by 
what happens at the atomic level and the level of macro- molecular aggregations.  
It should not be thought that faulty application of thermodynamical ideas is the sole 
purview of the anti-Darwinists. Mainstream evolutionary biologists are just as liable to 
produce complete nonsense when entropy meets evolution10.  
3.2 Probabilistic arguments  
The randomness inherent in the generation of genomic variants sits uneasily with those 
who are rightly impressed with the complexity of the traits that have appeared in evolution 
but unimpressed with what may be wrought by mere randomness. No one in their right 
mind would detonate a scrapheap in the expectation that the debris, falling back down to 
earth, arranges itself in the form of a jetliner. A. N. Wilson believes that the evolutionist’s 
answer to this poser simply relies on billions of years’ worth of time. Consistent with this 
misunderstanding, he thinks that Darwinism relies on extreme gradualism over geological 
time6.  
In reality, Darwin’s account of evolution involves an interplay between random mutations 
and directed selection. It is perhaps this juxtaposition of randomness and non-randomness 
that leads to confusion. The generation of mutants is not entirely random, as some mutants 
arise more readily than others. Moreover, a chance element remains in selection, since the 
fecundity of individual organisms remains subject to stochastic variation—selection only 
works through an average. The sheer improbability of a complex innovation indicates that 
natural selection would not normally be effective if all it did was waiting for a radically 
advanced mutation. A fairly elementary calculation shows why we should rather expect 
complexity to evolve by means of a series of small increments. Let us estimate T , the 
number of generations required to evolve a trait with Kolmogorov complexity 2K in a 
population of size N (which, for the sake of simplicity, is assumed to be the same in all 
generations). The “hopeful monster” model would estimate the probability of a mutant with 
this trait arising as 2−K . With N individuals in every generation, the probability that a 
generation fails to bring forth the hopeful monster equals exp{−N2−K} ≈ 1 − N2−K (the term 
on the left is a Poisson probability, and the approximation on the right is admissible when 
2K ≫ 1, which is certainly true since we are thinking of K as a large number). The required 
number of generations before the monster arrives then follows a geometric distribution 
with expectation 2K /N .  
Some monsters are improbable, but not unfeasibly so. For instance, whereas humans do 
not typically survive for much more than half an hour in near-freezing water, the rare 
individual who is at the far end of the various bell curves for several relevant physiological 
traits can survive for several hours. Since we know of at least one such person11, the 
probability is better than 10−10. Indeed, marine mammals, which are secondarily aquatic, 
have evolved several times independently (pinnipeds, cetaceans, and sirenians), with the 
harsh marine environment imposing a stringent, but by no means desperate, selection 
differential.  
On the other hand, if the trait arises through a series of intermediates and if p is the 
probability that the mutant with the next increment arises in a given organism, then the 
probability that a generation fails to bring forth the increment is exp{−pN } ≈ 1 − pN . The 
probability p and the increment ∆K are related by p = 2−∆K (we treat p and ∆K as constants, 
for the sake of simplicity). The expected number of generations to the next increment is 
(pN)−1. The total number of generations T is therefore given by (pN)−1(K/∆K).  
Comparing the results, we find: ln T scales as K − ln N for the hopeful monster model and 
as ln K − ln N + ln p−1 for the incremental model, which indicates that the incremental 
model requires far fewer generations to generate complex traits. The “hopeful monster” 
mode of evolution is exponentially less efficient than the incremental mode and we should 
therefore not be surprised to find that it is the dominant mode of evolution.  
One last refuge of the probabilistic argument against evolution is that incremental evolution 
is inherently implausible, since a complex trait typically relies on many components 
functioning together. An analogy often invoked to convey the idea is that of a watch: all 
the cogs and springs work together and the mechanism is entirely non- functional without 
everything being just so: if the watch evolved out of an ancestor watch with one cog slightly 
too small or too big (say), then that ancestor could not have been functional at all. 
Interdependence of intricate parts is an all-or-none sort of phenomenon, precluding a 
prehistory of gradual improvement.  
The fact of the matter is that incremental innovation is not only possible, but routinely 
observed. For instance, in the animal kingdom we find light-sensors ranging from neurones 
that can be irritated by photons, to sensors that are directionalised by pigment cups to one 
side, to pits that form a pinhole camera, which can then be equipped with focussing 
crystalline substances—lenses (Fig. 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 3: Innovations in the evolution of the eye. At each stage, the incremental change 
confers adaptive value. PhPi: a photopigment that is activated by light and readily 
regenerable (cells at this stage are involved in perceiving the light/dark cycle rather than 
image formation); ScPi: a screening pigment that confers a degree of directionality (no 
image is formed, but the animal can distinguish the approach of danger and escape in the 
safest direction); MmStk: a stack of membrane invaginations supporting an array of 
photopigment (enhancing the photon capture rate and thus allowing vision in dark and 
murky environments); DirSc: directed screening achieved by locating the photosensitive 
cells in a more or less shallow pit (which makes the eye more sensitive to stimuli coming 
from specific directions); CaLu: the pigment cup can form a camera lucida (rudimentary 
image formation); Opts: the introduction of optics permits image formation at higher 
resolutions; Cmp: compound eyes form an alternative to the single-camera eye.  
Whereas every innovation must confer adaptive advantage, innovations also act as 
exaptations: certain innovations are only adaptive provided others have been established12. 
For instance, incremental increases in neurone density and precision of connections and 
local circuitry in the image plane cannot contribute to fitness (and hence be favoured) 
before the focussing optics has evolved. It is possible and quite common, however, that a 
structure or process mediating function φ (and initially being selectively favoured because 
of this) becomes co-opted into fulfilling a differerent secondary function φ′ (which may 
ultimately play a much larger role in the organism’s biology); the exaptation is then called 
a pre-adaptation12. The end result is an eye with a retina and a lens, neither of which makes 
functional sense without the other.  
4 Philosophical feints  
As we have seen, proving Darwin wrong on scientific grounds is fraught with difficulty, 
as those more conversant with physics, chemistry, mathematics, and biology stand ready 
to come to his aid. An attack on philosophical grounds, by contrast, holds the promise of 
being both more elegant and definitive: if a fundamental inconsistency or other irreparable 
conceptual flaw can be brought to light, a stake can be put through the heart of Darwinism 
once and for all. Three interesting attempts will be discussed here.  
4.1 Belief in evolution as irrational and self-refuting  
Theist philosopher A. Plantinga introduced what might loosely be called an application of 
Gödel’s theorem to evolutionary science: if one wishes to be regarded as rational, one is 
logically compelled to reject evolution precisely when one commits to its truth: “you have 
to give up your belief that evolution is true […] The belief that both materialism and 
evolution are true is self-refuting. […] Therefore it cannot rationally be held.”13  
To arrive at this position, Plantinga first observes that, on a materialist view of the world, 
beliefs have to be understood as quasi-irrelevant byproducts of neurophysiological states 
or properties that correlate with adaptive behaviour. Here, “quasi-irrelevant” means that 
the truth or falsehood of the beliefs is wholly subservient to whether or not the beliefs 
(conceived of purely as neurophysiological states, i.e. certain configurations of certain 
collections of atoms in the universe) are adaptive. The adaptive value does not necessarily 
reside in any or all of the beliefs being actually true. This does not bode well for belief 
systems that involve many propositions, for if such a system rests on N beliefs with pi being 
the probability that the ith of these beliefs is warranted (subscribes to a truth rather than a 
falsehood), then the probability of the entire system amounting to a truth collectively is 
∏Ni=1 pi. Put differently, if L is the average value of ln{1/pi} among these beliefs, the 
collective likelihood of truth is exp{−NL}: reliability of belief systems decreases 
exponentially in their elaborateness14.  
One might object that it is not all that clear just how to count the beliefs that compose such 
a system, but in the spirit of our foregoing thermodynamical arguments we might allow 
that the qualitative conclusion remains the same as long as N is large enough. Another 
objection is that beliefs that have proven to be adaptive should not be expected to be 
arbitrarily true or false: surely the hardwired manner in which our brains fashion a picture 
of the world around us out of sense impressions should be expected to be a sensible one? 
This is the trap Plantinga has set: the naive biologist taking this tack is bound to get lost in 
the thickets of analytical philosophy.  
However, the fatal objection is that empirical evidence causes the scientist to adjust the 
values of the pi (this is precisely what Bayesian statistics is all about), and, even more 
importantly, in coherent belief systems the pi tend to be correlated in the way they react to 
empirical evidence, whereas Plantinga’s formula requires that the beliefs be statistically 
independent (he says: “remember that the probability that all of a group of beliefs are true 
is the multiplication of all their individual probabilities”13 which sounds rather as if he 
genuinely does not know that this is true only of statistically independent events—
otherwise he is being deliberately disingenuous which, for a devout Calvinist, is much 
worse than mere incompetence). Plantinga’s argument amounts to little more than dubious 
statistics.  
If we momentarily overlook the problem of statistical dependence, how then does 
Plantinga’s own belief system escape? One might suppose that his system comes off better 
since N = 1 in his case, but Plantinga’s argument is slightly more subtle (and anyway he 
appears to state that N ≈ 12 for his own belief system13). The formula exp{−N L} only 
applies to belief systems that reside in brains having evolved under a materialistic reading 
of Darwinism, and that is what makes evolution and materialism incompatible.  
On the other hand, on a theistic reading of Darwin, belief systems fare a good deal better 
(or at least some of them). Here the supreme being purposely guided the process of 
evolution (Fig. 2), resulting in humans that are equipped with the sensus divinitatus15, an 
inborn inclination to form correct beliefs about God directly, experientially (this sensus is 
apparently not functioning properly in agnostics and atheists, presumably due to some form 
of intellectual immaturity). Plantinga insists that Christians should believe in evolution, on 
his theistic reading15. In this respect he is more demanding than materialist evolutionists, 
who only ask that the evidence be contemplated.  
4.2 Fitness as a tautological concept  
If fitness is understood to be whatever allows a given type to become more prevalent over 
trans-generational time, and certain types are said to become more prevalent over trans-
generational time because they possess higher fitness, are we then not presented with a 
prime example of circular reasoning? Newcomers to ordinary differential equations often 
express similar misgivings, as both sides of the equation seem to suppose that one has 
already worked out what is on the other side. These two objections, however different at 
first glance, have a point of commonality: their respective resolutions are similar.  
One fact of the matter is that some types do become more prominent over trans- 
generational time, and another fact of the matter is that such trends do correlate with the 
genes that are transmitted through subsequent generations. “Fitness” is merely an index 
that quantifies this phenomenon; defining it in all generality is a matter of applied 
dynamics, complicated to no small degree by the fact that subtle aspects of stochasticity 
and contingency have to be properly taken into account16.  
The critics may well cry foul over this rejoinder, inasmuch as fitness was touted as a 
universal causal explanation and has now been reduced to mere parameter. One could shrug 
and glibly state that this is bound to happen whenever a science matures into 
mathematisation and recall how heat, energy, space-time and the like have gone the same 
way. Nevertheless, the presumed correlation between fitness values and genomic states 
still needs to be attested and documented in detail. This is not impossible in principle, but 
often tremendously challenging since the connection between genes and traits (which incur 
fitness values) involves all of functional biology. Since the latter is quite variegated and 
we do not have (or even aspire to having) a unified mathematical theory that encompasses 
all of functional biology17, evolutionary theory becomes essentially pluralistic at this 
point18,19. It might be better to acknowledge that evolutionary theory should be regarded 
rather as a kind of Kantian schema. These themes will be explored more fully in the 
following sections.  
 
Figure 4: Clash of the titans. Charles Darwin (left), Jerry Fodor (right), together with 
frontispieces of their contributions to scholarship in evolutionary science.  
4.3 Traits as impervious to natural selection  
Philosopher of mind J. Fodor offered a philosophical argument against Darwinism which 
is particularly interesting since it seems to leave almost all of evolutionary theory intact: 
differential reproductive success, correlated with genetic variation, giving rise to certain 
types persisting through evolutionary time for much longer than others. Since this is 
evolutionary theory in a nutshell, one may well wonder how Darwinism is going to receive 
its coup de grâce. It is thus: evolution cannot possibly explain why certain traits are thus-
and-so, since natural selection simply cannot tell one trait from the next. If we look to 
natural selection to provide a central and universal mode of explanation in evolutionary 
theory, we must find that it utterly fails in this regard, in essence because of the pervasive 
co-extensiveness of traits in the life histories of actual organisms.  
Somewhat like Wilson, Fodor presented his ideas in a book20 burdened with a vulgar title 
(Fig. 4) and myriad factual errors, duly savaged by numerous knowledgeable critics21–24. 
In several respects, Fodor’s subsequent polemic with the critics makes for more interesting 
and worthwhile reading, as there Fodor abandoned every pretense of caring one whit about 
biological details25.  
In its simplest form, “Fodor’s paradox” states that natural selection can never favour one 
trait and disfavour the other, since it does not deal with traits directly, but rather with entire 
life histories, which are inextricable bundles of traits20. If a rabbit has 2, or 3, or 5, 8, 13… 
offspring in its lifetime, who is to say that this is a particular reward for one trait or another 
(say the mass of its thigh muscles)? And come to think of it, is the lifetime reproductive 
output of any particular rabbit not mostly a matter of good or bad luck? All true, but natural 
selection operates over averages of many rabbits, and their correlations between genes, 
traits, and reproductive output are picked up and exert their effect. This response would 
seem to be all that needs to be said23, but Fodor insisted that he assented to this generally 
accepted account of natural selection which, however, is not what he understood to be the 
“Darwin bit”25 — a truly startling proposition tantamount to stating that virtually all 
 
Figure 5: A single trait, or many? From left to right: wild-type homozygous, mutant 
heterozygous, and mutant homozygous individuals of the zebra fish Danio rerio with a 
mutation at a locus that encodes an inward-rectifying potassium channel26. Among the 
countless trait descriptors associable with this mutation are: defective Kir7.1, loss of 
stripes, deficient α2-adrenoceptor signal, reduced melanophore mobility, 
elevated intracellular [Ca2+]. On which of these, if any, would natural selection focus, 
and how does it matter?  
evolutionists have hitherto failed to grasp the essence of Darwinism. Let us attempt to gain 
an understanding of what, in Fodor’s eyes, the “Darwin bit” came to.  
4.3.1 Traits: seemingly in the eye of the beholder  
Imagine a species of moth in which certain individuals are capable of hearing a bat 
approach and respond with a sudden evasive manoeuvre. The ones that exhibit this trait are 
capable of having more offspring, on average, and these offspring tend to display the same 
trait, insofar as the possession of this trait is genetically determined, and in subsequent 
generations, the portion of individuals with this trait tends to increase. Imagine also that, 
whenever a moth has this ability, it is also the case that a particular nucleus in its brain is 
pigmented and would show up purple if we were to open its head and cut up its a brain. 
Just what is being favoured by natural selection: the trait detection and evasion or the 
trait purple nucleus?  
We might discover that the purple nucleus is involved in flight manoeuvring, and its 
increased degree of pigmentation related in some way to the evasive capabilities (this is 
not nearly as far-fetched as it might first appear; see Fig. 5 for a real-life example which if 
anything is more outlandish than our hypothetical example). This would certainly be in 
keeping with the observed perfect correlation between the two traits. In fact, once the 
requisite molecular and neurophysiological research has been done to establish the link, a 
workaday physiologist would not hesitate to regard detection and evasion and purple 
nucleus as descriptors of the same trait, two descriptors that are only different in outward 
appearance, which is ultimately immaterial.  
What if, for whatever reason, our field work had never yielded observations of detection 
and evasion but we were able to collect observations on the colour of that brain area? 
Should we then conclude that purple nucleus was being “selected for” and would that be 
an egregious error? It does not matter from the point of view of those physiologists who 
know that the co-extensiveness of the trait descriptors can be attributed to the correlation 
in functional biology, because for them these descriptors are different names for the same 
trait anyway. However, those not privy to that additional knowledge would observe that 
natural selection 
Figure 6: Equivalent probe maps. A probe is conceived as a mapping from a set of life 
histories X to a set Y of trait values (trait descriptors). Partitioning the elements in X such 
that all the elements in each given subset of the partition are mapped to the same element 
of Y, and no elements not in that subset are sent to that particular element of Y, one arrives 
at the partition induced by the probe; each subset can be thought of as uniquely labelled by 
a trait value. The partitions P1–P6 are discussed in the text.  
 
favours the nucleus purpureus and have debates regarding the presumptive adaptive value 
of having purple neurones in hidden places. Is the notion of an operative trait that is 
“selected for” tenable, given that natural selection does not “see” individual traits, but only 
the bundles that constitute the life histories of the organisms concerned, and given that we 
name them through the prism of imperfect knowledge and understanding?  
4.3.2 Regimented traits  
If traits such as are the object of natural selection truly are in the eye of the beholder, this 
would prima facie entail a conflict with our more general supposition that science ought to 
be an objective endeavour, dealing in intersubjective concepts. At the very least, it would 
appear that we must be more careful when speaking of traits.  
A trait is a property that an organism might have, typically having a genetic correlate or at 
least some degree of genetic determination, alongside environmental factors. Properties of 
the genome itself correlate perfectly (albeit trivially) with genetics, even if such properties 
are not considered as traits in common biological parlance; this can be understood from the 
way the genotype/phenotype distinction arose historically.  
Property is a notoriously problematic notion27; the phrases we use as trait descriptors may 
suffer from referential opacity28. Different competent language users may differ where they 
cease to agree that a pea can still be said to be yellow. More worryingly, trait descriptors 
might be suggestive of adaptive quality, purpose, or mechanism, and these suggestions may 
point us towards proper biological understanding, but could just as well lead us astray.  
To reign in the confusion engendered by trait descriptors, we recast the discussion in terms 
of regimented traits. First, let a set of trait values be a set of trait descriptors, such as 
{green, yellow}. The set as a whole is the trait (although each element may also be spoken 
of as a trait, biological terminology being perennially sloppy): thus pea colour for the set 
{green, yellow}, or body length standing for the interval of physiologically allowed 
values. Let us also assume that we can associate the life histories of the organisms 
concerned to a given set of trait descriptors. There may well be theoretical and pragmatic 
questions surrounding observability, precision of measurement, access to the organism, 
and so on; let us assume that such issues can be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction. Finally, 
let us regard the act of associating to each life history (full developmental path) an element 
in a given set of trait values as a mapping, which we shall call a probe, to emphasise its 
role of an idealised observer.  
If we partition the set of life histories X into groups such that all members of each group 
map to the same value in the co-domain Y of a given probe, and no elements of X outside 
that group map to that trait value, we obtain the partition induced by that probe. In other 
words, this is a division of X into subsets each of which is labelled by the trait value that 
all of its members are sent to. Fig. 6 shows Venn diagrams of a set X together with various 
partitions.  
Two probes are said to be equivalent if they induce the same partition. A class of equivalent 
probes is called a regimented trait and each of its members can be taken as a representative, 
bearing in mind that the semantics of the probes’ co-domain elements (the trait values), 
and the biological explanations they suggest, may well be different. One could think of the 
regimented trait as the partition of X rather than the probes that induce the partition.  
Probes can be similar; for instance, one may locally be a refinement of the other. That is to 
say, X can be split into two complementary sets respecting both their partitions and such 
that in the first of these sets the first partition is a refinement of the second, and in the 
second set the second partition is a refinement of the first. The partitions P2 and P3 in Fig. 6 
are compatible in this sense: neither one is a refinement of the other, since both have a 
subset of life histories where they are coarser than the other. However, any two such 
compatible probes can be crossed to produce a maximal refinement, by taking all non-
empty intersections between the elements of their induced partitions. The result for P2 and 
P3 is the partition P1 which is a refinement of both P2 and P3.  
The partitions P4 and P5 in Fig. 6 are not compatible; their crossing is the refined partition 
P6, which can be regarded as a regimented trait in its own right; Boolean conjunction can 
be used to form the labels of a probe for this partition out of two representative probes for 
P4 and P5, respectively. Conversely, P4 and P5 can be regarded as projections of the 
regimented trait corresponding to P6.  
4.3.3 Weak and strong forms of Fodor’s paradox  
Regimented traits allow us to interpret Fodor’s paradox in various ways. In its weakest 
form, it is merely a word of caution: always be aware that the probe you are working with 
is no more than a representative of an equivalence class (the regimented trait): its semantics 
and its connotations may be misleading. In the words of Block and Kitcher: “. . . among 
these options [the probes], you can talk as you like. Any of them will distinguish the 
selection process.”21  
A stronger form of Fodor’s paradox is that what he called the “Darwin bit” becomes 
vacuous as soon as we restrict our attention to regimented traits. In particular, what drops 
out is the notion that the observed trait values are explained by natural selection or have 
arisen because of its adaptive value25. If indeed “you may talk as you like” then any 
particular choice of talk would seem to become meaningless. What is interesting about 
Fodor’s objections is that he did not deny the partitioning of X induced by any of the 
equivalent probes. The “fact of the matter about which of the correlated traits causes 
increased reproductive success” is not at stake25, that is, he countenanced the partition, and 
acknowledged that this partition represents differential reproductive success. But to Fodor, 
this was the crux of the matter: natural selection responds to this partition and only to the 
partition: it is blind to any of the probes that induce the partition. In his words, natural 
selection is “unable to distinguish the causes of fitness from their local confounds [i.e. other 
probes in the same regimented traits]”21. Consequently, it “makes no sense at all to speak 
of the aspects of a causal history that selection focuses on [...] Selection does not focus: it 
just happens”25. Fodor granted that we can take the partition as our cue to uncover what is 
happening at the level of functional biology, but he dismissed any such case-by-case 
investigation as an epistemological side-issue, because the explanatory power then accrues 
to the incidentals of the case at hand, and not to the theory of natural selection. For Fodor, 
the principle of natural selection fails as a (causal) law because it fails to clarify what all 
adaptations have in common “as such”22,25. 
There is an unambiguous procedure that allows us to associate differential fitness values to 
the elements of any given partition of X, the set of life histories16. Thus, it is mathematically 
possible to determine such fitness values for all possible partitions, and thereby discover 
which ones are associated with the largest fitness differentials. If there exists a unique 
maximising partitioning in this sense, it can be taken to define the direction of the selection 
gradient and hence the “natural” coordinate system for trait space. This identifies an 
evolutionarily most salient regimented trait. The evolutionist’s thesis is that among the 
probes pertaining to this most salient trait, there will nearly always be ones that correctly 
identify the relevant functional biology via “semantic” denotation. 
 4.3.4  Contingency and the resolution of traits  
Taking stock, we see that much of Fodor’s misgivings overlap with those noted in 
Section 4.2: causal connections are local and must be treated on a case-by-case basis, which 
renders evolutionary science pluralistic, to such a degree that its status as providing general 
explanations must be called into question. One stance that could be adopted in the face of 
such charges is that concerns of this nature tend to recede into the background whenever a 
discipline becomes mathematisised: naive notions of causality are replaced by precise 
mathematical constraints, and opinions regarding what does and what does not constitute 
an explanation are just that: opinions.  
On the other hand, once a science becomes mathematisised, some other issues come more 
sharply into focus. One such issue, closely related to Fodor’s paradox, is that natural 
selection does not operate on life histories in a general, abstract space, but on a finite (and 
comparatively speaking minute) set of such life histories within a limited time frame. In 
other words, evolution is contingent and it is not clear that the theory has properly come to 
terms with this difficulty12.  
Life histories travelled by real organisms do not necessarily collectively sample what we 
intuitively envisage as the “full space” of possibilities, not merely because the realised 
histories are contingent on external inputs such as environmental catastrophes (such 
“external” contingencies can be suppressed, at least in a formal sense, by conditioning on 
the time paths of the relevant inputs) but more importantly because of the irreducible 
randomness of the mutational process, the results of which are ultimately frozen in the 
genotype and thereby influence the phenotypic effect of any future mutations. For instance, 
the non-compatible probes, of which partitions are shown as P4 and P5 in Fig. 6, can be 
made compatible in various ways by deleting selected life histories. More generally, 
regimented traits will coalesce when elements are removed from X. In fact, all traits become 
one and the same when X is a singleton set; such extreme coalescence represents Fodorism 
in its purest form. The upshot is that along with any regimented trait, the set X should be 
specified.  
The simplest instantiation of X is perhaps Xt, the set of life histories of the organisms extant 
(alive) at time t in the population (or species) of interest. If an evolutionary selection 
process takes place between times t0 and t1, then the union Xt0:t1 = t0≤t≤t1 Xt is the relevant 
set to define regimented traits that were “selected for” i.e., the subject to selection over that 
time interval. Godfrey-Smith29 carefully discusses the issue of delineating the 
interval [t0, t1], i.e., the relevant portion of history in his account of the precise meaning of 
biological functions (which he defines as dispositions or effects associated with a trait).  
A more sophisticated version of Fodor’s paradox can now be formulated: there is no way 
to be sure, in general, that Xt0:t1 resolves the operative regimented trait with sufficient 
refinement to identify the relevant functional-biological causal factors. 
Another way of looking at this objection is that we can imagine cloning the world an 
infinite number of times at time t0 and taking the union of the versions of Xt0:t1 from each of 
these clone worlds. The result XΩ. may allow for a refined identification of causal factors 
in a way that the historical set Xt0:t1 does not. We should perhaps hasten to add that XΩ is 
invoked here only as the result of a thought experiment; the universe over which we allow 
our cloned worlds to vary is not a priori well-defined (for the present purposes, a rough 
idea will do). Moreover, provided that we are willing to countenance optimality principles 
in evolutionary processes, we may find life histories in XΩ that are superior in some suitable 
technical sense.  
Evolutionists have long been familiar with spandrels, which are traits (physiological 
processes, anatomical structures) that would seem mystifying until it is discovered that they 
are natural concomitants of operative traits; by the latter is meant that the spandrel arises 
because of the way the organism’s ontogeny, physiology, or ecology is set up12. For 
instance, the moth in the introductory example may have wing notches that, on first sight, 
“serve no purpose” which raises the question why they have been “selected for.” In the 
language of regimented traits, spandrels are not particularly problematic, as they are simply 
probes belonging to relevant regimented traits that happen to have a semantics (labelling 
in the set of trait values) that can engender confusion.  
However, Fodor was not concerned with spandrels, but with true free riders: coalesced 
traits that, in the history Xt0:t1 such as it happened, just were always co-occurring with the 
operative factors, with Hume-like haplessness. The set XΩ might have eliminated any 
spurious co-extensiveness, but, Fodor says, natural selection never saw enough of XΩ. The 
fact that Xt0:t1 and XΩ can lead to different conclusions reflects the central importance of 
contingency in evolution.  
The evolutionist’s working hypothesis is that evolutionary histories can generally be 
expected to resolve salient regimented traits23. The final state of affairs, when the selection 
process is concluded, may lead us to underestimate the resolving power of Xt0:t1; that is, for 
t > t1, the set Xt will tend to coalesce traits which Xt0:t1 resolves (nearly) as well as XΩ. Once 
traits become fixed, there is less variability and an increased level of correlation, perhaps 
even with tight supergene-type linkage (genes whose alleles are highly compatible in 
specific combinations tend to aggregate in tight clusters known as supergenes, which are a 
pervasive feature of genetic architectures30,31). By contrast, there tends to be much more 
variability during the process of selection; variability that can be regarded as the fuel that 
drives evolutionary processes. Periods of rapid evolution tend to occur at times of 
geophysical upheaval, when populations migrate, are subjected to a wider range of 
evolutionary pressures and new opportunities, and hybridise with closely related 
(sub)species32,33; all these processes promote the generation of variability and thus act to 
disturb Fodor’s perfect correlations.  
If XΩ seems to be too fanciful a construction, we may consider a more modest expansion 
of the historical set Xt0:t1 by performing suitable experiments (which might involve painting 
polar bears orange, or setting them free on pacific islands, to determine whether their fur 
is adaptive in being white, being thermo-conservative, or being arctic camouflage). One 
fears that the resulting set of life histories Xexp would also have been repudiated by Fodor 
since they contain counterfactuals which natural selection could never have entertained. 
Nevertheless, Xexp may often turn out to be a suitable proxy for Xt0:t1 .  
5 Outlook : enduring greatness  
If evolutionary science accords Darwin a special place in the pantheon, it is in recognition 
of the thoughtful and cogent way he put forward the central ideas of natural selection, 
supported by data he gathered during his famous voyage on the Beagle. Of course a great 
many aspects of the relevant biology were unknown in his day, and we can hardly blame 
him for his ignorance in such matters.  
The developments in genetics and developmental biology greatly expanded the scope of 
Darwinism: there was hardly any sort of consensus that Darwin had been made obsolete 
by these advances, but rather that his theory had been enriched with a firm grounding. This 
integration is commonly known as the Modern synthesis34 and it owes its stability to the 
coherent mathematical framework in which Darwin’s 19th-century ideas, Mendelian 
genetics (and its consequences at the population level), and 20th-century insights into the 
molecular and cellular nature of genes, traits, and development were reconciled. This 
framework matured into the theory of evolutionary population genetics35–37, which has 
have been extended with formal systems at various levels of abstraction, such as adaptive 
dynamics38, Rice’s geometric treatment of Price fitness39, or the ensemble-based principle 
of fitness16.  
More recent advances have been assimilated in the same vein: much more is now known 
about the interplay between genomic reorganization events and the reconfiguring of 
developmental processes, the role of phenotypic plasticity, the alphabet of inheritable 
information is considerably extended by the phenomenon of epigenetics, we know more 
about how larger aggregations of organisms co-evolve, we consider natural selection at a 
meta-level by treating “evolvability” as a trait in its own right, and so on16. Perhaps 
unavoidably, these developments prompt dreams about a new paradigm shift rivalling 
Darwin’s original one (with fanciful names such as “post-modern synthesis” or “extended 
synthesis”) and there has been no shortage of upstarts who would play Einstein to Darwin’s 
Newton (although invariably lacking the mathematical sophistication that such a feat would 
most likely require), giving rise to an unpleasant kind of careerist disparagement of Darwin 
that, coming as it does from within, strikes one as so much more deeply deplorable than 
the jejune misunderstandings offered by politicians, historians, or philosophers. 
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